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What is incentives’ goal?   
• Goal: Increase in per-cap income of original residents, mostly due to 
higher earnings per cap due to higher employment rates & wages.   
• Why original residents? (1) They’re paying for incentives; (2) In-
migrants have minimal gains.   
• Why earnings focus? What about fiscal benefits? Fiscal benefits 
small because: (1) state/local fisc captures small portion of 
increased earnings; (2) limited responsiveness of S/L taxes to 
growth; (3) job growth increases pop growth 80% as much, which 
has large fiscal costs.  
• Fiscal benefits of job growth typically less than 10% of earnings per 
capita benefits.  
1 
Implications of targeting incentives on 
goal of higher earnings per capita   
• Incentive ROI models should compare present value of higher 
earnings per capita with PV of incentive costs.  
• Incentive policy should be viewed as a type of state labor demand 
policy & part of overall state labor market policies. Coordination with 
other state labor market policies (e.g., training, education) should be 
considered. 
• Incentive policy must consider what jobs pay, not just jobs created. 
• Incentive policy must consider who gets jobs, not just # and types of 
jobs created.  
• Maximizing jobs growth or earnings growth or gross state product 
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Figure 1  Logic Model for How Incentives Affect Earnings Per Capita 
Who Gets Jobs 
(local UR, firm, match, local hiring policies)  
Who Receives Incentives 
Local Earnings Per Capita 
Incentive Design Factors 
(new invest vs. existing,  
upfront vs. over time  
& vs. services) 
Incentive design (Part 1): How sensitive is  
business investment to costs?  
• Cost reduction = 1% of value-added has average effect of 
increasing LR economic activity by 4%. 
• Although mean is 4% effect, plausible range from 1% to 12%.  
• Larger effects more plausible if special reasons for higher sensitivity 
(footloose large multinationals? Metro areas straddling border?) 
• Avg. state/local incentive package = 1.5% of value-added, which 
implies increases economic activity by 6%. 5.7% (=.06/1.06) of 
incented activity is induced. 
• At extreme, 5% of VA incentive might increase economic activity by 
60% (12*5). 38% (.60/1.60) of incented activity is induced.  
• Conclusion: incentive models must allow for large deadweight loss 
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Relative incentive costs to government of different 
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Upfront marginal cost incentive 
Annual costs of three incentive designs that lower marginal costs of new investment by 1.5% 
NOTE:  Vertical axis shows incentive costs as percentage of industry VA.  Horizontal axis is year since incentive regime started.  
Assumptions:  9% annual job creation and destruction in incented industry; firms use 12% discount rate. 
Lowering PV of governmental cost of delivering a 
particular MC reduction via incentives 
• Always better to target new capital rather than including old capital.  
• If “social discount rate” is less than 12% used by firms, than upfront 
incentives have lower PV to achieve a given MC reduction.  
• Relative costs versus AC incentive: At 3% discount rate, MC 
incentive costs have 75% of PV costs, upfront MC incentive has PV 
of 48%; at 7% discount rate, PV ratios are 60% and 48%.  
• Other issues: clawbacks; budget planning and sustainability. 
• Customized services (e.g., customized training, MEP) have been 
found to sometimes reduce business costs by 2 times their 
governmental costs. Implication: can lower PV costs to 24% of AC 
incentive 
6 
Who gets incentives: export-base, multipliers, 
and wage premia 
• If incented activity is not export-base, has no multiplier or even net 
direct effects on incented industry.   
• Benefit-cost ratio of incentives varies proportionately with multiplier.  
• Recent research by Moretti suggests multiplier not just determined 
by input-output relationships, but also by cluster/agglomeration 
effects (e.g., estimated multiplier of 6 for  high tech).  
• Wage premia of incented jobs also matters. Rule of thumb: 
simulations suggest that 10% higher wages in incented firms 
increases earnings per cap benefits of incentives by about 10%.  
7 
Who gets the jobs: the vacancy chain logic 
• Ultimately, newly created jobs must result either in employment of 
local non-employed, or employment of in-migrants.   
• If created jobs hire mix of local non-employed/in-migrants/local 
employed, the jobs filled by local employed create other vacancies, 
which are filled also by some mix. 
• This vacancy chain is only terminated when net new jobs are 
divided only among local non-employed and in-migrants.  
• Example: 100 new jobs: 20  in-migrants, 10 local non-employed, 70 
local employed. 70 vacancies filled by some mix. Jobs filled by in-
migrants/non-employed increase as vacancy chain proceeds.  
• Employment rate effects of job creation depends not just on 
incented firms’ hiring, but on how local labor market works  
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% of jobs to local non-employed in "average" situation 
% of jobs to local non-employed in 
"average" situation 
NOTE:  Chart shows percent of job growth that goes to local non-employed as of various time periods after growth shock.  Remainder 
goes to in-migrants. 
Job growth has much greater benefits for 



















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Year 
"High" UR (10.0%) 
Average UR (6.2%) 
"Low" UR (4.2%) 
% of job growth to local non-employed 
NOTE:  Earnings per capita benefits end up being 40% higher when UR is 10% compared to 6.2%; 20% lower when UR is 4.2% 
rather than 6.2%. 
Increasing incentive benefits by affecting 
who gets jobs  
• Target high-UR areas: each 1% of higher unemployment increases 
benefits of job growth by about 10%.  
• Target firms more likely to hire locally, and more likely to hire local 
non-employed. 
• Improve the overall quality of local workforce system. 
• Local first source hiring standards may help, IF linked to effective 
workforce system. 




• Main benefit of incentives is higher state earnings per capita. Job 
growth and earnings growth are means to end . 
• Incentives have higher benefit-cost ratio if: 
– Target more sensitive decisions; 
– Lower PV of government cost versus cost reduction delivered to firms via 
targeting new capital, making incentives more upfront, or delivering incentives via 
cost-effective services.  
– Target export-base firms with high multipliers & high wages; 
– Target high UR areas, and seek to increase hiring of local non-employed.  
12 
Discussion questions 
• In analyzing benefits vs. costs of incentives, what is your state 
implicitly identifying as main goal of state economic development 
policy? 
• In modeling incentives, what assumptions is your state making  
about how powerful incentives are in inducing location or expansion 
decisions? 
• How does your state take into account export-base status of firms? 
• How are multipliers included, and how are they estimated? 
• How does your state’s modeling of incentives take into account 
effects of induced job growth on employment rates versus 
population growth?  
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